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Dynamics of Social Corrections to Peers Sharing COVID-19 
Misinformation on WhatsApp in Brazil
Abstract
Objective
Online COVID-19 misinformation is a serious concern in Brazil, home to the second largest 
WhatsApp user base and the second highest number of COVID-19 deaths. We examined the 
extent to which WhatsApp users might be willing to correct their peers who might share 
COVID-19 misinformation. 
Materials and Methods
We conducted a cross-sectional online survey using Qualtrics among N=726 Brazilian adults 
to identify the types of social correction behaviours (SCBs) and health and technological 
factors that shape the performance of these behaviours. 
Results
Brazil’s WhatsApp users expressed medium to high levels of willingness to engage in SCBs. 
We discovered three modes of SCBs:  correction to the group, correction to the sender only, 
and passive or no correction. WhatsApp users with lower levels of educational attainment and 
from younger age groups were less inclined to provide corrections. Lastly, perceived severity 
of COVID-19 and the ability to critically evaluate a message were positively associated with 
providing corrections to either the group or the sender. 
Discussion
The demographic analyses point to the need to strengthen information literacy among 
population groups that are younger with lower levels of educational attainment. These efforts 
could facilitate individual-level contributions to the global fight against misinformation by 
the World Health Organisation in collaboration with member states, social media companies 
and civil society. 
Conclusion
Our study suggests that Brazil’s WhatsApp users might be willing to actively respond with 
feedback when exposed to COVID-19 misinformation by their peers on small world networks 
like WhatsApp groups.
Keywords: misinformation; COVID-19; social media; correction; behavior; Brazil
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Dynamics of Social Corrections to Peers Sharing COVID-19 
Misinformation on WhatsApp in Brazil
INTRODUCTION
Online misinformation,defined as “any health-related claim of fact that is false based 
on current scientific consensus”,[1] has posed barriers to the promotion of preventive 
behaviours and caused social unrest during the COVID-19 pandemic. This global problem has 
invited a range of responses from several stakeholders such as social media companies and the 
World Health Organisation to developers of misinformation games and news, media, and 
information literacy initiatives.[2-5] However, what is less understood is the role that the vast 
population of 3.8 billion social media users [6] could themselves play in tackling the issue of 
misinformation. Our paper focuses on the role and extent of WhatsApp users’ willingness to 
correct their social peers who might knowingly or unwittingly share COVID-19 
misinformation on this popular messaging platform.  We first present the conceptual ideas that 
informed our study, describe the study context, detail the methods, present our findings, and 
discuss their implications for theory, policy and practice surrounding the management of online 
health misinformation that has now returned to thwart COVID-19 vaccination programs.
Conceptual Framework
Online misinformation is corrected through a range of interventions including myth 
busting campaigns by public health agencies, algorithm-based news dissemination and by 
using expert organizations, journalists and fact-checkers. [7-9] Besides being as effective as 
algorithmic corrections in correcting misperceptions, [7] the limited evidence surrounding 
corrections made by social media users reveals the psychological and technological dynamics 
at play in influencing this behavior.
WhatsApp users can either witness someone else being corrected, experience being 
corrected, or perform a correction themselves. [10] This study focuses solely on the 
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performance of correction which we refer to as social correction behaviors (or SCB). We 
conceptualize SCB as the voluntary act of feeding back with a deliberate intent to counter 
perceived misinformation sent by a social media user within one’s WhatsApp network. Given 
the nascence of this research area, we draw upon contemporary evidence and classic theories 
of health behaviour to identify social psychological factors that inform our conceptual 
framework underpinning this study.  
Research has shown that social media users ignore fake news posts and offer 
corrections only to those with whom they have strong relationships.[11] This suggests that the 
closeness of social ties in small networks like WhatsApp groups that are oftentimes 
comprised of family members or friends might provide a trusted environment, leading 
members to engage in social correction behaviours. However, verifying and correcting every 
misleading claim can be a time-consuming process.[12] While researchers have examined the 
relationship between time spent on social media and psychological health and well-being,[13] 
the extent to which it can contribute to positive behaviors like verifying and correcting 
information with peers is little understood. Another possible consideration affecting users’ 
decisions around whether or not to provide corrective feedback to peers could be influenced 
by how social norms are perceived in small networks like WhatsApp groups. Specifically, 
social peers have been found to be more accepting of the expression of positive rather than 
negative emotions across Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Twitter.[14] However, when 
these patterns were disambiguated by platform, expressing negative emotions was found to 
be most acceptable on WhatsApp (ibid). Placing this evidence in context, it is likely that 
social correction behaviours in a WhatsApp group might generate negative or positive 
emotions in the original sender and other members of the group could affect the decision of 
the user to perform such corrective behaviours. 
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In addition to the abovementioned technological factors related to exposure to 
misinformation - critical evaluation of the message, time spent on social media, and the social 
norms of WhatsApp groups- we suggest that beliefs related to health risks might also affect 
SCB against misinformation. This argument is supported by extant evidence which shows 
that the perceived severity of, and perceived susceptibility to COVID-19 contribute to 
cyberchondria (compulsively seeking online information related to illness or symptoms) with 
males more likely to share news without verifying its accuracy.[15] Conversely, we are 
interested to find out if perceived severity of and susceptibility to COVID-19 may persuade 
WhatsApp users to issue social corrections to those spreading misinformation in their online 
groups. Lastly, while it is known that demographic factors like age, sex, income and 
education play a role in shaping misinformation beliefs [8 16 17], the extent to which they 
affect SCB is unknown.
 The decision to perform SCB is thought to be based on a variety of factors such as 
cognitive and time costs of evaluating the veracity of information, normative perceptions 
about the appropriateness of such behaviour, and variations in our understanding of what 
constitutes as misinformation. These factors were reflected in decisions made by users 
including whether or not to make a social correction, when to make a social correction (now 
or later), and to whom to make a social correction (only to the sender or the group). Based on 
this framework, our study seeks to investigate the following questions.
RQ1: How do WhatsApp users in Brazil engage in social correction behaviors?
RQ2: How do these social correction behaviors differ by demographic factors?
RQ3: How do factors related to misinformation consumption (exposure and beliefs), 
technology, and health beliefs jointly predict these social correction behaviors? 
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We examine these questions in Brazil, a country with the second highest number of 
COVID-19 deaths globally.[18] Brazil also constitutes the second largest market with 146.6 
million users.[19] The application allows members to create and subscribe to groups, which 
function as hives of information sharing among users.[20] However, its popularity has meant 
that WhatsApp has been prolifically misused not only for political propaganda during the 
2018 national general elections but also as a channel for COVID-19 misinformation.[21 22] 
More than 70% of Brazilians believed in COVID-19 misinformation with WhatsApp being 
the main vector of misinformation in the country.[23] Consistent with incidents seen in other 
countries, misinformation circulating on social media sought legitimacy by false attribution to 
the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Fiocruz), one of the country’s main public health 
institutions.[24] Subsequently, Fiocruz  disseminated corrective information via online social 
networks to debunk false information attributed to itself and shared illustrated step-by-step 
guidelines to help people verify health information on online social networks. Other 
initiatives to combat COVID-19 misinformation by the Brazilian Health ministry included 
like the “Saúde sem Fake News’ website – not updated since July 2020 – where a dedicated 
team of journalists would factcheck WhatsApp messages sent by users.[25] They found that 
messages categorized as false were usually about health authorities, prevention, prognosis of 
the disease, therapy and vaccination and that COVID-19 misinformation was placing public 
behavior and the credibility of Brazil’s National Health Service (SUS) at risk. Another study 
that examined 4,180 users of the SUS website from across the country demonstrated that 
Brazilians with access to online social networks have basic knowledge about COVID-19 and 
can identify false information. Respondents knew more about prevention, transmission and 
social distancing, but had difficulty in identifying symptoms, risk groups and correct conduct 
in case of infection. Men, the elderly and people with low education or from places with a 
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lower human development index (HDI) found it more difficult to detect false information. 
[26]
In correlated efforts to curb the effects of misinformation, a multi-center study was 
conducted to examine the impact of a digitally delivered intervention where medical students 
from 12 colleges demystified fake news and responded to COVID-19 questions from 375 
elderly residents. The initiative highlighted how interpersonal communication facilitated by 
digital channels like WhatsApp could enable a greater understanding of the risks of 
misinformation among the elderly population.[26] While these programs suggest disparate 
institutional efforts to curb online COVID-19 misinformation, we are interested in the 
dynamics of individual-level actions undertaken to tackle this problem. 
METHOD
Study Design
In this cross-sectional study, we analysed a subset of questions enshrined within a 
larger dataset of a Portuguese-language online survey of WhatsApp users in Brazil, assessing 
their responses to COVID-19 misinformation and corrective information. As part of this 
online survey, a convenience sample of WhatsApp users from Brazil were recruited online by 
Qualtrics (a global professional survey firm headquartered in the United States) between 26th 
May and 10th June, 2020. All participants were required to be adult WhatsApp users (18 years 
of age or over), who had heard of COVID-19. In the survey questionnaire, we also asked 
participants about their sex, age, highest level of education attained, household income, and 
time spent using WhatsApp to discuss COVID-19 (see Table 1 in Findings section for 
detailed participant profiles). 
Measures
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Misinformation Exposure and Beliefs: Misinformation exposure and beliefs were 
assessed using five examples of misinformation messages that were circulating on social 
media in Brazil immediately prior to the start of our data collection. Examples of these 
messages included: “Coronavirus (COVID-19) does not spread in places with warm/hot 
weather”, “You can protect yourself from coronavirus if you eat hot food or drink hot water”, 
and “Hot pineapple water can cure coronavirus”. Participants indicated ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ as to 
whether they had seen these messages on WhatsApp prior to taking part in the study, with 
more ‘Yes’ answers indicating greater exposure to the misinformation message. Participants 
were then asked to rate the accuracy of the five statements individually using a 5-point 
Likert-type scale ranging from 1= “Completely inaccurate” to 5= “Completely accurate”.
Given that the COVID-19 situation at the time of data collection was still rapidly 
evolving, we leveraged the local expertise of one of our co-authors, a health communication 
researcher, to identify specific examples of misinformation. They provided five examples of 
misinformation that were circulating in Brazilian WhatsApp networks. The team verified 
each statement against the scientific consensus at the time to ensure that all the statements 
were indeed misinformation.
Health Beliefs: Perceived severity of and perceived susceptibility to COVID-19 were 
both measured using a three-item 5-point Likert scale adapted from Witte et al. (1996),[27] 
ranging from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5 = “Strongly agree”. Specifically, perceived severity 
was measured with statements like “I believe Coronavirus (COVID-19) has serious negative 
consequences” (α = .69). Perceived susceptibility was measured with statements like “It is 
likely that I will get Coronavirus (COVID-19)” (α = .86). 
COVID-19 Information Seeking on WhatsApp: A self-structured three-item measure 
of information seeking on WhatsApp was created for this study (α = .82) and presented to 
participants to respond using a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5 
Page 8 of 35
https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/jamia




































































ia/ocab219/6407150 by guest on 22 O
ctober 2021
8
= “Strongly agree”. Items included statements like “I intend to seek Coronavirus (COVID-
19) related information on WhatsApp frequently.”
Critical Message Evaluation: Critical message evaluation was measured using five 
items adapted from Scull et al. (2010) [28] on a 5-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1= 
“Never” to 5 = “Always” (α = .86). Items included statements like “When I view social 
media messages posted by my friends, peers, or people like me, I think about the purpose 
behind the message/post”.
Time Spent Discussing COVID-19: Time spent discussing COVID-19 was measured 
using a single item “How much time do you spend looking at or discussing COVID-19 
information on WhatsApp each day?”, on a 5-point Likert-type scale: where 1 = “no time 
spent at all”, 2 = “less than one hour”, 3 = “between one and three hours”, 4 = “between three 
and five hours” and 5 = “more than five hours”. Points four and five were combined for 
analysis to maintain similar proportions of the sample in each of the categories (see table 3 
for frequencies).
Social Correction Behaviors: Based on the conceptual framework, a self-structured 
10-item scale 5-point Likert scale (1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly agree”) 
comprising different combinations of whether or not participants would send a correction, 
when they would send the correction and to whom they would send it were developed. For 
instance, one of the question stems said: “If you find that there is incorrect or fake COVID-19 
misinformation in a WhatsApp forward you have just received you will…”, with the 
following responses: inform the sender immediately / inform the sender after waiting a while 
/ not inform the sender at all. A complete list of statements is available in Table 2. 
Procedure
Ethical approval for the study was granted by a research university in the United 
Kingdom. Participants were recruited online by Qualtrics through multiple platforms: social 
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media, e-mail invitations to propriety panels and online advertising (including online survey 
platforms). An anonymous link to the study survey was used in all recruitment methods. 
Participants received remuneration for their participation based on how they were recruited, 
some received points which could be redeemed for items whilst others were directly 
reimbursed the monetary value for participation. Participants were shown an information 
sheet outlining the nature of the study and informing them of what they would be required to 
do, if they consented. Those who did not consent to take part in the research were skipped to 
the end of the survey. Those who consented first provided demographic information. 
Participants then completed the survey in the order described in the Questionnaire section 
before being debriefed. Contact details for the principal researcher were included in the 
information and debrief sheet should participants need further information, prior, during or 
after their participation in the study. Participants took approximately 10-15 minutes to 
complete the survey. 
Data Analyses 
All data were analysed using SPSS version 27 [29]. Descriptive statistics were first 
calculated for the predictor and control variables in the study (see Table 1). Three participants 
who identified their sex as ‘other’ were excluded from the analysis. The consideration of 
gender minority communities was outside the scope of this study but merits future 
investigation. The final analysis thus accounted for only male and female respondents, with 
gender being treated as a continuous variable. [30]
We performed a principal component analysis (PCA) using orthogonal rotation on the 10 
SCB items (see Table 3 for results and new factors). Independent samples t-tests were then 
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used to determine any statistical differences between any of the control predictors with two 
levels (see Table 4) and a one-way independent groups ANOVA for control predictors with 
three levels (see Table 5) and the dependent variables. Predictor variables were then input 
into a correlation matrix (see supplementary information) to assess any multicollinearity 
issues. Finally, three hierarchical regressions (see Table 6) were run (one for each of our 




We initially recruited 1100 participants of whom 197 did not provide consent, 102 were not 
WhatsApp users, and 162 were excluded as duplicates, incomplete datasets or for not 
completing the study within time parameters. Three participants who identified their sex as 
‘other’ were excluded from the analysis due to marginal representation. The final analysis 
accounted for N=726 participants or 66% of the initially recruited sample.
Participant Profile (Table 1)
Our sample was predominantly male with a majority of the participants having 
completed at least an undergraduate degree (55%) and most (~40%) belonging to the middle-
income bracket (R$3,000-6,999). Exposure to misinformation about COVID-19 not 
spreading in hot weather was the highest (65.3%) and the curative powers of pineapple was 
the lowest (17.6%). More than 7 in 10 participants spent fewer than three hours discussing 
COVID-19 on WhatsApp every day. Perceived severity of COVID-19 among the participants 
was higher than perceived susceptibility to being infected by it.
Table 1: Participant demographic profile and descriptive statistics of key independent 
variables of interest (N=726).
Variables Categories n %
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< Undergraduate degree 328 45.2Education
≥Undergraduate degree 398 54.8
R$2,999 and less 261 36.0Monthly Household 
Income R$3,000- 6,999 290 39.9







COVID-19 does not spread in hot weather 474 65.3
Hot foods and drinks can protect you from COVID-19 300 41.3
COVID-19 vaccines already exist 312 43.0
Gargling salt water/vinegar can protect you from COVID-19 332 45.7
Misinformation Exposure*
Hot pineapple can cure COVID-19 128 17.6
No time spent 267 9.2
< 1 hour 267 36.8
1-3 Hours 257 35.4
Time Discussing COVID-
19 on WhatsApp
>3 hours 135 18.6
*Frequencies denote number of participants who responded “yes” when asked whether they had come across 
each of these statements
Scale Statistics (Table 2)
Means, standard deviations and reliability scores for all scales are presented in Table 2. 
Overall, we found low levels of misinformation belief among participants but high levels of 
perceived severity. All the scales used in the survey had high levels of reliability measured by 
Cronbach’s  ranging from 0.82 to 0.90.
Table 2: Summary statistics of scales used in the analyses
Variable M SD Cronbach’s 
Misinformation Belief 1.58 .80 .83
Critical Message Evaluation 3.34 1.05 .86
WhatsApp Information Seeking 3.23 1.08 .82
Perceived Severity 4.43 .73 .90
Perceived Susceptibility 3.48 .92 .85
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Correction to Group 3.73 .92 .81
Correction to Sender 3.90 .88 .66
Passive/ No Correction 2.22 .84 .54
Social Correction Behaviors (RQ1, Table 3)
The 10 items in the PCA loaded on to three distinct types of social correction 
behaviors: 1) Correction to Group, which involved different versions of providing feedback 
to the whole group (e.g. a group chat/message), 2) Correction to Sender, which involved 
providing feedback on the misinformation separately or individually to the sender only, and 
3) Passive/No Correction, which involved not engaging in either of the above two SCBs.
Table 3: Principal component analysis identifying three distinct types of social 
correction behaviors.
Factor loading Summary StatisticsSocial Correction Behaviors
1 2 3 α M(SD)
Factor 1: Active Correction to Group .81 3.73 (.92)
Inform the whole group that the forward had inaccurate 
information
.75 .13 -.29
Address the sender individually but send the message to the 
entire group
.84 .04 .13
Supply the accurate information to the whole group .71 .21 -.33
Address the sender individually but supply the accurate 
information to the entire group
.83 .09 .15
Factor 2: Active Correction to Sender .66 3.90(.88)
Inform the sender immediately .26 .54 -.42
Inform the sender privately/separately that the forward had 
inaccurate information
-.03 .84 .03
Supply the accurate information to the sender 
privately/separately
.20 .76 -.11
Factor 3: Passive/No Correction .54 2.22 (.84)
Inform the sender after waiting for a while .25 .32 .51
Not inform the sender at all -.08 -.12 .82
Take no action at all -.12 -.18 .77
Note: This table displays the findings of the PCA conducted on the 10 items used to assess feedback response to 
forwarded COVID-19 messages. The table shows three key factors which were identified following this analysis 
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and the relevant reliability and descriptive statistics for these factors. Values in bold indicate the best fit for each 
item on to the 3 factors. 
Demographic Differences (RQ2, Tables 4 and 5)
Our analyses revealed three significant differences. A significant effect of age on 
passive or no correction was found (p = .01): younger participants (18 – 54 years) (M = 2.33, 
SD = .88) were more likely to engage in passive or no correction than older participants (55+ 
years) (M = 2.12, SD = .78). Education was found to have a significant effect on correction to 
the sender (p = .02); participants with an undergraduate level degree or higher (M = 3.97, SD 
= .87) were more likely to engage in correction to sender than those without an undergraduate 
degree (M = 3.82, SD = .89). 
Finally, a statistically significant effect of sex was also found on correction to group 
(p = .04): male participants (M = 3.79, SD = .89) indicated a higher preference than female 
participants (M = 3.64, SD = .94) for engaging in correction to group. No significant 
difference of income was found for any of the dependent variables.
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Table 4: T-test findings highlighting differences between age, sex and education across dependent variables: active group or private 
feedback and passive/no feedback.
















Active Group Feedback 3.71 (.96) 3.71 (.87) -.65 .51 .04 3.79 (.89) 3.65(.94) 2.02 .04* .15 3.68 (.89) 3.77 (.93) -1.35 .18 .10
Active Private Feedback 3.90 (.93) 3.90 (.83) -.10 .92 <.01 3.88 (.88) 3.93 (.88) -.72 .47 .06 3.82 (.89) 3.97 (.87) -2.40 .02* .17
Passive/No Feedback 2.33 (.88) 2.12 (.78) 3.47 <.01*
*
.25 2.26 (.84) 2.17 (.84) 1.45 .15 .11 2.28 (.82) 2.18 (.85) 1.60 .11 .12
Notes: In the T-test statistic columns, t refers to the t statistic, p refers to significance of the tested difference <.05 denotes a significant difference (<.05* and <.01**), d refers 
to the Cohens D a way of measuring the size of the effect found.
Table 5: ANOVA findings highlighting differences between monthly income brackets and the dependent variables: active group or 
private feedback and passive/no feedback.








df F p 2s
Active Group Feedback 3.68 (.88) 3.81 (.93) 3.67 (.95) 2, 723 1.76 .17 .01
Active Private Feedback 3.83 (.92) 3.95 (.86) 3.90 (.88) 2, 723 1.48 .23 <.01
Passive/No Feedback 2.26 (.83) 2.23 (.88) 2.16 (.84) 2, 723 .74 .48 <.01
Notes: In the ANOVA statistic columns, df refers to the degrees of freedom, F refers to the F statistic, p refers to significance of the tested difference <.05 denotes a 
significant difference (<.05* and <.01**), 2s (partial eta squared) is a measure of effect size for the independent groups ANOVA
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Factors Influencing Social Correction Behaviors (RQ3, Table 6)
We performed hierarchical linear regression analysis to separately analyse predictors 
of the three social correction behaviours (SCB) while controlling for demographic variables 
(age, sex, education and income). The main predictors assessed were misinformation factors 
(exposure and beliefs), technological factors (information seeking on WhatsApp, critical 
message evaluation and time spent discussing COVID-19 on WhatsApp) and health beliefs 
(perceived severity and perceived susceptibility) as the predictors (IVs). Initial correlation 
analysis (included in Supplementary Information) detected no issues with multicollinearity (r 
≥.80) between predictor variables, showing that the predictors were not strongly related to 
each other. 
Table 6 (RQ3): Regression models showing standardised beta weights for factors that 
predict social correction behaviors.




Passive or No 
Correction 
 
Age (55+) .03 -.01 -.06 
Sex -.08* .03 -.01 
Education (UG+) .03 .05 -.01 
1 (Demographic) 
Household income -.06 -.01 .00 
 
Misinformation exposure .04 .02 -.00 2 (Misinformation) 
Misinformation belief .01 .03 .11** 
 
Information seeking on 
WhatsApp 
.20** .21** .14** 
Critical message evaluation .15** .10** -.13** 
3 (Technological) 
Time Discussing COVID-19 -.01 .11** .14** 
 
Perceived Severity .07 .14** -.20** 4 (Health Beliefs) 
Perceived Susceptibility .03 -.05 .02 
     
5 (Correction Behaviours) Correction to Group - .20** -.00
 Correction to Sender .22** - -.17**









 N 726 726 726 
    
(*p<.05, **p<.01)
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Correction to Group: The final model was able to significantly account for 19% of 
the variance in correction to group (R2 = .19, p < .01). Of the predictors included in this 
model,  information seeking on WhatsApp (b = .20, p < .01),  critical message evaluation (b = 
.15, p < .01), and correction to sender(b = .22, p < .01) were found to be three positive 
predictors of correction to group: participants  seeking more information on WhatsApp,  
conducting more critical message evaluation and being more likely to send corrective 
information privately to the sender, were more likely to engage in correction to group as a 
ways of social correction. Sex was also found to be a significant predictor of correction to 
group: female participants reported a lesser preference to engage in  group feedback than 
males (b = -.08, p = .03). Among the significant predictors, the standardised beta-weights 
suggest that correction to sender had the strongest relationship with group feedback, thus 
functioning as the strongest predictor for participants’ behaviour surrounding correction to 
group. 
 Correction to Sender: The final model was able to significantly account for 24% of 
the variance in correction to sender (R2 = .24, p < .01). Despite education having a significant 
effect on correction to sender prior to the regression (see results for RQ2), education was not 
found to be a significant predictor on this SCB (b = .05, p=.15). Five of the remaining 
variables were found to be positive predictors of correction to sender: perceived severity (b = 
.14, p < .01), information seeking on WhatsApp (b = .21, p < .01), critical message evaluation 
(b = .10, p < .01),  time spent discussing COVID-19 (b = .11, p = .01), and correction to 
group (b = .20, p < .01): participants perceiving higher COVID-19 severity, seeking more 
information on WhatsApp, conducting more critical message evaluation,  spending more time 
discussing COVID-19, and more likely to send corrective information to a group, were more 
likely to engage in correction to sender. Passive or no correction was found to be a negative 
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predictor of correction to sender (b = .15, p < .01).  Information seeking on WhatsApp was 
found to be the strongest predictor of correction to sender.
Passive or No Correction:  The final model was able to significantly account for 17% 
of the variance in passive or no correction (R2 = .17, p < .01). Despite leading to significant 
differences in passive or no correction prior to the regression (see results for RQ2), age was 
not found to be a significant predictor in this model (b = -.06, p=.10). Six significant 
predictors were found in this model. Three of these were positive predictors: misinformation 
belief (b = .11, p < .01), information seeking on WhatsApp (b = .14, p < .01), and time spent 
discussing COVID-19 (b = .14, p < .01): participants with more misinformation belief, 
seeking more information on WhatsApp, and spending more time discussing COVID-19 were 
more likely to engage in passive/no correction behavior. The other three, critical message 
evaluation (b = -.13, p < .01),  perceived severity (b = -.20, p < .01), and correction to sender 
(b = .17, p < .01) were found to be negative predictors: participants perceiving lower 
COVID-19 severity,  conducting less critical message evaluation and corrections to sender 
were more likely to engage in passive/no feedback correction behavior. Standardised beta-
weights suggest perceived severity was the strongest predictor in the model.
DISCUSSION
We sought to understand how individual social media users might engage in social 
correction behaviors (SCB) pertaining to online misinformation and the which demographic, 
health belief and technological factors that influence this behavior. Studies of peer-norms on 
social media in times of crises (including public health crises) reveal how networked peers 
might influence communication and various behavioral outcomes. [31-33] We identified 
three distinct types of individual-level SCB:  Correction to Group (sent to one’s WhatsApp 
group), Correction to Sender (correction sent only to the original sender of the 
Page 18 of 35
https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/jamia




































































ia/ocab219/6407150 by guest on 22 O
ctober 2021
18
misinformation), and Passive/No Correction. Our survey first revealed the pattern of how 
different demographics influenced the three types of SCB: first, younger participants 
exhibited greater passivity in engaging with social correction; second, higher educational 
attainment was associated with providing correction to the original sender; third, male 
participants were more likely in to sending the correction to the entire group. 
Information seeking and critical message evaluation significantly affected all three 
SCB types. Information seeking was positively associated with all three SCB types (i.e., the 
more individuals seek information about COVID-19 on WhatsApp, the more likely they are 
to engage in both active and passive SCB). Given the nascence of this research area, our 
study does not offer immediate explanations for this finding. We speculate that this 
association there might be related to the content of the COVID-19 information sought on 
WhatsApp or subsequent information processing, neither of which our study has not 
captured. Contrastingly, critical message evaluation is an important determinant of whether 
one engages in active (i.e. group and sender corrections) or passive SCB (i.e. no correction). 
Individuals who critically evaluate messages are thus more likely to correct misinformation 
via group- and/or sender-corrections on WhatsApp.
We also found that each SCB has a distinct strongest predictor: namely, correction to 
sender for correction to group (positive association), information seeking for correction to 
sender (positive association), and perceived severity for passive/no correction (negative 
association). These findings suggest that encouraging users to actively seek (accurate) health 
information could make them more likely to send corrections to the sender which emerged as 
the “anchor” SCB – meaning, it connected and helped predict other SCB types in positive 
(Correction to Group) and negative (Passive/No Correction) directions, respectively. It seems 
that misinformation correction among Brazilian WhatsApp users is a cultivated process: 
those who are keen on correcting the sender alone might be encouraged or facilitated to share 
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their corrections more publicly, in a group setting.  In terms of passive SCB, we find that an 
elevated perception of the severity of the health risk might discourage users from engaging in 
SCBs. From a health risk communication standpoint, this finding highlights the importance of 
calibrating messages around the severity of health risks in a manner that is commensurate 
with the actual level of risk. 
Interestingly, while the predictive power of age and education seemed to be 
diminished in the hierarchical regression model when entered as control variables, sex 
remained a stand-alone significant predictor of SCB (i.e., female participants were more 
reluctant to engage in providing social correction to the group). If we consider the role of 
normative beliefs in such contexts, it is possible that the prospect of being negatively 
perceived by the group discouraged female participants from engaging in SCB to the group. 
This sex-based behavioral pattern in group correction merits further theoretical investigation 
as well as practical considerations about motivating female social media and mobile app 
users to engage in more public social correction with higher visibility and group impact.
As a relatively understudied strategy for correction of misinformation, social 
correction can be positioned between self-correction via information-vetting [34] and external 
correction routes via government health agencies and news media. Social correction can be 
an effective supplemental correction strategy to help amplify public health authorities’ 
misinformation debunking efforts and news media’s fact-checking measures. Depending on 
the features and characteristics of different social media platforms, whether social correction 
is provided to the misinformation sender privately or in a group has implications on the 
process and magnitude of impact of such correction efforts. Such efforts can be properly 
enabled or facilitated by social media platforms to unlock the persuasive power of social 
media peers when they exert their influence based on factual information and the motivation 
to correct people in their networks.[13]
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In terms of health beliefs, we found that perceived severity was a powerful predictor 
of all three feedback routes of social correction, based on our study among WhatsApp users. 
Campaigns to help enhance the perception of threat severity could help with social correction 
in small networks like WhatsApp. We found that critical message evaluation was important 
amongst the technological factors. Message evaluation, which is important in the primary 
information vetting process,[34] seemed to lead the user towards providing feedback. 
Because of this, our findings highlight the need to build critical thinking and informational 
literacy skills among social media users.
Spending a greater amount of time on WhatsApp discussing COVID-19 was 
significantly associated with providing correction to the sender, and negatively associated 
with providing no correction. Therefore, it appears that the time spent deliberating over and 
discussing information received on WhatsApp facilitates peer-to-peer dialogue-based social 
correction. The private route, although not amplifying the correction in a group setting, might 
encourage the sender to consider vetting the information further (even revising their own 
original judgement on the information and themselves), thus initiating secondary information 
vetting[ibid].
Misinformation belief was significantly associated with “passive/no correction” but 
not with “active correction”. This finding implies that those with high belief in 
misinformation are less inclined to engage in SCB while those with low belief in 
misinformation are more inclined to do so. Such a scenario would be useful in minimising 
situations where scientifically accurate information might be erroneously corrected by group 
members with high belief in misinformation. This finding strengthens the case for 
interventions that can bolster SCB by building skills to differentiate between accurate 
information and misinformation. 
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This suggests that awareness about one’s beliefs in misinformation might prove to be a 
deterrent against practising active social correction behaviours. It is possible that deeply 
entrenched misinformation beliefs might undermine such an inference and is beyond the 
scope of the study. However, if our finding is supporteding by future research, such a 
deterrent would be especially useful in preventing instances where social media users would 
might end up correcting content that might, in fact, be based on scientific consensus. In such 
a context, our findings strengthen the case for interventions that strengthen the ability of 
social media users to recognize misinformation and their belief in it which, in turn, might 
shape healthier social correction behaviours. 
Lastly, we found moderate to high levels of SCB to the group and privately to the 
sender. This finding indicates an important opportunity for Brazil’s public health 
establishment to leverage in terms of combating COVID-19 misinformation. Our inference 
from this finding is consistent with the assertion that Brazil’s social media users might benefit 
from resources by public health agencies that provide them with evidence that are attributed 
to specific sources.[24 25] These resources could further strengthen social media users’ 
ability to function as community-based misinformation watchers and alleviate the burden on 
fact-checking agencies. Equally, these fact-checking agencies could help develop community 
capacity in identifying misinformation, using online information verification tools, and 
generating source-based corrections that could be sent by users.[35]
Our study has several limitations that constrain the generalisability of our findings and 
could be addressed by future research. First, the current study only studied looked at two 
elements of the health belief model (HBM), perceived severity and perceived susceptibility. 
Other HBM elements, such as perceived benefits and barriers of preventive action and 
perceived self-efficacy, needs to be further examined in future studies applying the full HBM 
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model to studies of managing the “infodemic” (spread of excessive and false information).[2] 
Second, this study was conducted at a single point in time. To enhance ecological validity, 
future studies should consider using a longitudinal design to compare the pre-and-post effects 
of each point of corrective communication and multiple exposures to misinformation and 
corrective information. How the state of COVID-19 (mis)information evolves, exerting 
different impacts on behavioral outcomes at different phases or stages of the pandemic, needs 
to be further examined by longitudinal studies, especially how individuals respond to and 
manage informational uncertainty and complexity in the context of a dynamic public health 
crisis.[36] Third, our study sample is not representative of the Brazilian population. The 
generalizability of the findings in future research studies may be enhanced using 
representative samples with stratified sampling strategies. Fourth, misinformation exposure is 
limited to a potentially arbitrary selection of misinformation messages found on social media. 
As the quality and nature of the content of each message differ, subsequent SCB may vary 
depending on the quality of content to which users are exposed. The frequency of exposure to 
such messages was not captured in the current study. Additionally, temporal factors (e.g., the 
time from exposure to content on social media and later peer interaction on social networking 
platforms like WhatsApp) that may influence peer interaction behaviors need to be 
investigated by future studies. Lastly, the definition of misinformation we employed - as any 
claim that is false based on current scientific consensus – must be consumed with caution for 
two reasons. One, it may be challenging to measure consensus among scientists at any one 
point in time. And two, if deployed loosely and prematurely, the consensus can be 
exclusionary of other less well-held perspectives that may be more evidentiarily robust and, 
in doing so, create new ground for misinformation. 
CONCLUSION
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More than a year after the COVID-19 pandemic, online misinformation continues to 
impede the public health response to of vaccination programs by exacerbating vaccine 
hesitancy and denial through conspiracy theories and misleading claims about safety and 
side-effects.[37-39] In this scenario, when public health systems are stretched, sometimes to 
the limit, individual-level behaviors to combat misinformation could complement systems-
level infodemic management efforts. Our study adds new elements to these efforts by 
identifying factors related to health belief and social media use, along with key demographic 
factors and misinformation belief, as essential drivers that explain and predict infodemic 
management outcomes at the levels of the individual user and their social media community. 
Our findings also highlight the importance of activating all viable routes for misinformation 
correction, unlocking the power of social correction as amplifying source joining a conduit 
linking the influence of self-correction via information vetting and corrective communication 
and fact-checking efforts initiated by public health authorities and news media. We also note 
the responsibility of public and private health institutions to invest in information literacy 
initiatives by distilling complex scientific jargon into more accessible content and infuse a 
greater sense of personal responsibility in being vigilant to COVID-19 misinformation 
circulating on WhatsApp and other social networks. 
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